In a number of recent policy statements, the Labour government has developed a series of reforms for employer-sponsored company pension schemes, an integral element of the contracting out arrangement of compulsory second-tier pensions. At best, the reforms are ambivalent. While they address a number of important issues, they are likely to reinforce income insecurity. Above all, we identify a range of issues that must be integral to the reform of company pensions, but that have been ignored by the government -compulsory employer contributions, universality and the role of employees in sponsoring and administering pension schemes.
Introduction
Company pension schemes have been enormously popular among employees because they have been based on the defined benefit principle 1 which requires future retirement benefits to be specified as a proportion of final salary. This means that future retirees know their future retirement income potential well in advance. However, this type of non-state pension arrangement is in decline. In recent years, such schemes have been closed to new members or wound up, and pension benefits have been reduced. This has resulted from a number of pressures, including investment revenue shortfalls, active underfunding and the forced disclosure of pension fund deficits under the controversial FRS17 accounting standard. These developments have been accompanied by human interest stories focusing on the resultant negative prospects facing scheme members during retirement. At risk is the legitimacy of the Labour government's strategy to boost retirement savings by promoting a significant expansion of private sector provision, reserving public provision for a minority of lowincome savers. The government has responded to these issues by publishing a consultation document (SSWP, 2002) that sought advice and feedback on the problems facing company pension schemes and an action plan (SSWP, 2003) that presents the measures that will be introduced to reform company pensions. We focus on the most controversial of the proposed reforms. However, all of the proposed reforms and the timescale for their introduction are outlined in Table  1 . At best, the reforms are ambivalent. While they address a number of important issues, they are likely to reinforce the pressures that result in company pension scheme closure. This may be viewed with particular alarm by carers, women workers and ethnic minority groups, whose exclusion from good quality pension schemes will be accentuated (Ginn, 2003) . Above all, we identify a range of issues that must be integral to the reform of company pensions, but that have been ignored by the government -compulsory employer contributions, universality and the role of employees in sponsoring and administering pension schemes.
Security: improving member protection?
One element of the reform framework is security -the long-term security of accrued pension benefit entitlements.
Insolvent companies
Perhaps the key reform in the government's action plan is the introduction of an insurance scheme, the Pensions Protection Fund (PPF), to protect company scheme members where firms with underfunded pension liabilities become insolvent. This compensation scheme will pay 100 percent of pensions in payment and 90 percent of the pension entitlements of those who lose their employment prior to retirement. This will be funded by a flat-rate levy on all private sector employers who sponsor company pension schemes. The government acknowledges that this measure may give rise to perverse incentives such as: s active underfunding and high-risk investment portfolios. The government will address this through higher risk-based premiums for companies that do not adequately fund their pension schemes; s voluntarily initiated company insolvency to avoid pension scheme liabilities. The government will address this by capping pension benefits payable through the PPF. This cap will be equivalent to the pension that may be expected by those on a final eligible salary of between £40,000 and £60,000.
However, the action plan fails to acknowledge the possibility of distinctive remuneration arrangements for employees at different levels of the company. The inventiveness of 'failing' companies in designing generous severance packages for senior executives has been demonstrated poignantly in recent years and is unlikely to be addressed effectively by the present government. It is unlikely that this cap on insured pensions will provide a significant barrier to the practice of avoiding pension scheme liabilities through voluntarily initiated company insolvency.
Solvent companies
The government has expressed similar concerns about the accrued rights of active contributors where solvent companies choose to wind up their defined benefit schemes. The government has addressed this immediately by restricting 'the ability of companies to take money out of the scheme' (SSWP, 2003: 14) ; in short, scheme funding should permit a 'full buy-out' of accrued pension entitlements for active contributors.
Again, in the absence of additional measures, the impact of this reform may be negative and in a number of distinct ways. First, it is clear that, even where company pension schemes are deemed to be adequately funded, their assets may be insufficient to accommodate the terms of full buy-out. Underfunding is perpetuated by the Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR); recent estimates suggest that, even when a company scheme meets the MFR in full, the balance may cover as little as 40 percent of accrued pension benefit entitlements. As if to reinforce this, the Labour government plans to relax the MFR (see below), accentuating the risk that pension scheme assets will be insufficient to meet the terms of full buy-out. Second, the reforms are likely to have a negative impact on the quality of second-tier pension provision. In particular, the more stringent requirements of full buy-out and the enhanced risk of company insolvency will deter employers from sponsoring defined benefit pension schemes while encouraging those who do to replace them with defined contribution schemes.
Transfers
Full buy-out is to be complemented by measures to promote security for a specific group of employees of a solvent company -those who are transferred within their employment or whose employing company has been taken over by another company. First, the government will extend existing employment protection law, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (TUPE), to cover company pensions, so that scheme membership is not arbitrarily terminated by employers. Second, where the scheme is wound up, it proposes a requirement for employers to sponsor a defined contribution stakeholder pension, where employee contributions are matched by employer contributions to a level of 6 percent. While the extension of TUPE to cover pensions is welcome, it is undermined by the option to replace a defined benefit scheme with a stakeholder pension. The employer contribution will not compensate employees for the loss of a guaranteed final salary pension, and thus the measure falls 'far short of full protection for employees ' (TUC, 2003: 29) .
Unequal entitlements
Reflecting the prevalence of underfunding, the statutory priority order, which determines the distribution of scheme assets in the event of scheme wind-up, gives precedence to pensioner members, ranking non-pensioner members equally -thus, many who are approaching retirement age may be left with few pension entitlements. The government has addressed this by introducing regulations in autumn 2003 to link the degree of protection to 'the length of time a member has been contributing to the scheme, that is, those who have contributed the longest will receive the greatest protection' (SSWP, 2003: 15) .
While this is a clear improvement, it perpetuates the relative disadvantage of active contributors while failing to address the central issue -the reform is 'about redistributing the pain caused by a funding shortfall and not about reducing the amount of pain overall' (TUC, 2003: 27) . If adequate funding is required by statute and enforced robustly, the 'issue of the priority order on scheme wind-up will become irrelevant ' (2003: 27) .
Simplicity: greater flexibility for employers?
A second element of the reform framework is simplicity: the ease with which employers may sponsor pension schemes.
Scheme-specific funding arrangements
The intent is to reduce the MFR, which imposes financial constraints on company pension schemes, thereby allowing each scheme to rebalance its investment risk-return strategy to match its membership age and needs profile. Scheme trustees will thus have to draw up a statement of funding principles, impose appropriate employer and employee contributions under a schedule of contributions and provide regularly updated information to members. Where trustees and the employer are unable to reach agreement on the appropriate employer contributions, the trustees can freeze or wind up a scheme, which would require solvent employers to meet the full cost of accrued pension rights, 'unless doing so would put the company itself at risk, in which case the trustees . . . can agree a lower amount' (SSWP, 2003: 14) . At issue is whether the decision-making process that gives rise to a set of scheme-specific funding arrangements is transparent Interestingly, the action plan says nothing about the standards by which the adequacy of the contributions specified in the schedule of contributions should be judged. It also makes no reference to the enforcement of contribution collection and to the extent to which financial surpluses should be allowed to finance contribution holidays or contribution reductions, whether by employees or, as is much more likely, by employers.
Easing the indexation requirement
The mandatory indexing of final salary pensions to inflation (as measured by the Retail Price Index) is to be abandoned and replaced by an inflation adjustment rate capped at 2.5 percent per year. This is justified on the curious grounds that an annual adjustment of up to 2.5 percent is better than nothing, which is what beneficiaries of defined contribution schemes receive. Individual company pension schemes will be free to adjust pensions according to inflation within the minimum cap as they see fit.
At issue is whether the extant low rates of inflation will continue indefinitely. This raises the spectre of the future value of accumulated pension assets -premised on the imposition of contribution rates that are just sufficient to finance inflation-capped future pensions -being insufficient to finance any full inflation adjustment that might be politically expedient to reintroduce some time in the future.
Increasing scheme flexibility
The government intends to give company pension schemes 'the freedom to adapt to changing circumstances, while continuing to provide security for their members' (SSWP, 2003: 25) . This means that any member's accrued rights can be changed by an employer without his/her consent, but only if the scheme rules permit; the changes do not convert defined benefit rights into defined contribution rights; the trustees agree; the total actuarial value of members' accrued rights is maintained at the time of change; current pension payments are not reduced; and members are consulted before the change is made. Clearly, this may undermine trust and confidence in company pension schemes, which requires a degree of member involvement in their management and administration.
Reflecting this concern, the government's action plan requires that at least one-third of trustees will be member-nominated, although it is not prescriptive as to how they will be selected beyond indicating that the pensions regulator will be expected to issue guidelines on the matter. The case for member-nominated trustees representing more than one-third of all trustees, and for their selection process to be more tightly prescribed, rests on the need to build public confidence in trustees: to whom are they accountable, employer sponsors or employee members?
Choice: promoting individual responsibility?
A third element of the reform framework is choice -the ability of individuals to make appropriate decisions regarding their retirement savings. This will be promoted mainly by ensuring that savers have access to better information about available pension products, but also by age discrimination legislation and related retirement age provisions (see Table 1 ).
There can be little doubt that information is important to consumers of pensions and retirement savings products. However, there are profound problems with the importance that is attached to the role of information by the government. First, it fails to address the central issues that inform retirement savings decision-making. Above all, research has shown that variations in retirement savings are associated with income differentials (Rowlingson, 2002; TUC, 2003) ; not surprisingly, low incomes restrict the capacity to save. Reflecting the importance of income, retirement savings decision-making is also influenced by the willingness of employers to contribute to their employees' pensions, as suggested by recent evidence on variations in company pension scheme membership (Vidler, 2002) .
Second, and by extension, the government's disproportionate focus on information entails an explanation of income deprivation during retirement that focuses on the choices that are made by individuals during their working lives; it individualizes the problem. In effect, this ignores the structural imperatives that result in insufficient pension benefits -social divisions in employment and policy decisionmaking -which present low-income savers with limited choices or no choices at all. Because of 'interrupted and unpredictable employment trajectories' (Ginn, 2003: 21) , both impact disproportionately on carers, women workers and ethnic minorities, who are underrepresented in good quality pension schemes. Faced with these imperatives, sub-optimal retirement savings decisions are inevitable. In addition to improved information, which is essential, we believe that all savers should be presented with the meaningful option of a good quality pension scheme.
Missing dimensions
So far, we have assessed the government's policy on company pensions according to the terms of reference that are set out in its recent policy statements. In this section, we turn to issues which, while integral to any robust consideration of company pension reform, have been largely ignored by the government.
The first issue is income redistribution, a consideration of which is necessary to ensure that the reform of company pensions has the capacity to reduce drastically, or even abolish, poverty during retirement. The effectiveness of different approaches to income redistribution is likely to be variable.
Perhaps the most conservative approach is the provision of meanstested minimum income guarantees at the point of retirement. Instead of seeking to achieve redistribution within pension schemes, this approach targets tax-financed public subsidies on those whose post-retirement income does not reach a particular threshold, one that is deemed to be above the poverty line. However, any redistributive strategy that relies exclusively on means testing is unlikely to achieve satisfactory incomes for all retirees, although it may prevent destitution among the poorest.
Second, there have been proposals for a universal tax-financed flatrate income, payable to retirees by virtue of their citizenship status (for example, Ginn's recent proposal to 'replace the basic state pension with a citizen's pension set at a level high enough to prevent poverty and indexed to national standards of living ' [2003: 111] ). Although we favour this emphasis on universality, fiscal resources alone are unlikely to generate sufficient revenues to ensure a satisfactory income for all retirees. Any attempt to achieve this would undoubtedly encounter tax resistance because there are few employees 'who do not already contribute substantially via consumption taxes, payroll taxes . . . and income tax' (Blackburn, 2002a: 469) . In short, additional revenue streams are required.
Third, there have been proposals for the introduction of mandatory defined benefit pension schemes that entail vertical redistribution. This could be achieved by making company pension schemes mandatory by requiring all employers to sponsor and contribute to company pension schemes. However, this approach is unlikely to minimize retiree poverty because company pension schemes are deeply divisive -coverage and eligibility are employment based, resulting in inadequate pension benefits for low-income savers and the exclusion of those outside of the labour market. Although we favour compulsory employer contributions and the defined benefit principle, employment-based coverage and eligibility are inconsistent with universal needs satisfaction.
Fourth, there have been proposals for mandatory employer contributions to universal second-tier pensions. Of particular note is the work of Blackburn (2002a, b) who has developed a radical approach to pre-funding, the share levy, which would 'work very much like the share options which boards have been showering like confetti on chief executives' (Blackburn, 2002b: 18) . The share levy would require companies to issue new shares annually, at the rate of 10-20 percent of profits, to universal second-tier pension funds. This would be used to finance egalitarian rules governing contribution and benefit rates and credits covering the 'full amount of the minimum contribution for those outside employment -carers, students, invalids [sic] and the unemployed' (Blackburn, 2002a: 477-9) . At a stroke, this would restore and extend the employer contribution while ensuring that the benefits of good quality pension scheme membership are universal.
It is clear, therefore, that the options for redistribution are much broader than is acknowledged by recent government policy on company pensions. The failure of the government to engage with this debate and to act on it by introducing compulsory employer contributions, combined with a degree of universality, means that its reforms will fail to ensure a satisfactory post-retirement income for all.
The second issue (again, largely ignored by the government) is control -who controls the organization and administration of defined benefit pension schemes? In the UK, they are sponsored exclusively by employers, who exert a significant influence on scheme administration. As we have seen, this has had a number of negative consequences, both for employee members and the broader public interest.
Reflecting on these issues, recent commentaries (Blackburn, 2002a, b; Therborn, 2003) suggest that employees are alienated from their pension rights; by virtue of their deferred earnings, employees already own much of the industrial economy, yet they have few if any opportunities to influence decision-making about the administration of these vast resources. To prevent this, Blackburn (2002a) proposes a system of stakeholder-led welfare whereby membership organizations are permitted to sponsor defined benefit pension schemes. For the purposes of this review, we define membership organizations as those where the production of an economic surplus is not the overriding consideration and where there is a significant element of collective decision-making.
Above all, we would suggest, employees should be encouraged to become involved in sponsoring and administering pension schemes through their trade unions, which 'allow workers to act in concert in the labour market, tilting the balance of power in an enterprise towards its employees and away from owners' (Hebb, 2001: 1) . Recent research (Ghilarducci, 1999) suggests that where there is a significant trade union influence on the administration and regulation of company pension schemes, employee members interests are given a higher priority: employers pay higher contributions, take fewer contribution holidays, and the formulae that are used to calculate pension benefits are more generous. This suggests that, in effect, the involvement of employees in the administration of pensions stimulates retirement savings, providing a novel solution to the UK savings gap; combined with compulsory employer contributions and a degree of universality, measures to encourage employees to act as sponsors of defined benefit pension schemes may be a key element of an effective strategy to boost retirement savings.
Conclusion
The Labour government's broad aspiration to promote retirement savings by expanding funded private sector provision is undermined by its specific reforms of the defined benefit company pension sector, which are, at best, ambivalent. While they address a number of important issues, the reforms seem likely to reinforce further the decline of defined benefit schemes, promote the further expansion of less popular defined contribution plans and, overall, intensify insecurity for savers and retirees. However, there are options which, if pursued robustly, may be successful in closing the UK savings gap. The central problems underlying insufficient savings, low incomes and declining trust in private pensions may be addressed effectively by compulsory employer contributions, a degree of universality and the engagement of employees in sponsoring and administering pension schemes. Although elements of this approach have been adopted elsewhere (notably in Finland, France and Australia), they have been ignored by the UK Labour government. This omission will have serious consequences.
Note
1. Unlike public pension schemes, where benefits are financed on a pay-asyou-go basis from fiscal resources, company and personal pension schemes invest employee and/or employer contributions in capital markets: benefits are financed by accumulated savings and the income that is derived from such investments. Although all private pension schemes share this method of financing, they may differ in the way that benefits are calculated. Many company pension schemes have been based on the defined benefit principle which, in the UK, means that contributors have a right to a pension that is equivalent to a proportion of their final salary. Thus, benefits can be calculated and known well in advance of retirement. The company is obliged to pay this final salary pension even if capital markets have performed badly. In stark contrast, some company pension schemes and all personal pensions operate according to the principle of defined contributions. Where this applies, a person's future pension benefits depend entirely on the long-term performance of capital markets and thus cannot be known in advance of retirement. It is clear, therefore, that defined contribution schemes do not provide the same degree of future benefit certainty as do defined benefit schemes.
